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Observations from Our Review of Completed Cybersecurity Assessments

By: Mike Detrow, Senior Consultant and Manager of IT

Financial institutions have begun the process of completing the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool provided by the FFIEC and some are struggling to complete it accurately. In this article, I will discuss the process for using the tool, as well as some of our observations from the review of these completed assessments.

Using the Tool
The Cybersecurity Assessment Tool was designed to help financial institutions identify their Inherent Risk Profile and evaluate their level of Cybersecurity Maturity. The end result is for financial institutions to understand the relationship between the risks associated with the activities, services, and products offered and the adequacy of the controls used to mitigate these risks. During the completion of the tool, management must collaborate with personnel from all internal departments and include third parties that are providing risk management services, such as IT service providers.

Determine the Inherent Risk Profile
The assessment process begins with the identification of the institution’s Overall Inherent Risk Profile. The tool identifies five categories for the activities, services, and products in place at the institution. For each activity, service, or product, management must select the most appropriate inherent risk level based upon the options listed within the tool. Once this process is complete, management must determine the Overall Inherent Risk Profile based on the number of applicable statements in each risk level. As an example, if the majority of activities, products, or services fall within the Minimal risk level, management may determine that the institution has a Minimal Overall Inherent Risk Profile. As each category may pose a different level of inherent risk, management should consider evaluating whether a specific category poses additional risk in addition to evaluating the number of instances selected for a specific risk level.

Determine Cybersecurity Maturity Level
The second part of the assessment is to evaluate the institution’s Cybersecurity Maturity Level for each of the five domains identified within the tool by indicating whether or not the institution has attained each of the Declarative Statements within a specific maturity level for that domain. To attain a specific Cybersecurity Maturity Level for a domain, 100% of the Declarative Statements within that maturity level must be attained.

Determine Relationship Between the Two Parts
The tool includes an illustration showing the relationship between the Inherent Risk Level and the Cybersecurity Maturity Level. As an example, if an institution has determined that it has a Minimal Overall Inherent Risk Profile, the recommended Cybersecurity Maturity Level range for each domain is Baseline to Intermediate. As an institution completes the assessment, the first goal should be to ensure that the Baseline Cybersecurity Maturity Level is attained for each of the five domains identified by the tool as the Baseline level identifies the minimum expectations required by law, regulations, or supervisory guidance. If an institution has not yet reached the Baseline level at the time of the Cybersecurity Assessment completion, an action plan should be developed to implement the requirements to attain the Baseline level. Once the institution has attained the Baseline level, management can determine the target Cybersecurity Maturity Level and develop an action plan to attain that level. In the example above, for an institution with an Overall Inherent Risk Profile of Minimal, management may determine that their target Cybersecurity Maturity Level is Evolving. It is important for financial institutions to understand the relationship between the Overall Inherent Risk Profile and the recommended Cybersecurity Maturity Level identified in this tool to recognize that regulators will not expect an institution with a Least or Minimal Overall Inherent Risk Profile to attain a Cybersecurity Maturity Level of Advanced or Innovative.

Observations
The primary issue that we have identified through our review of completed Cybersecurity Assessments is the misinterpretation of the Declarative Statements. Each of the Declarative Statements within the Baseline level has a reference to the associated FFIEC Information Security Booklet, which allows institutions to locate additional information about the requirements to attain the statement. Management should review the references to the FFIEC Information Security Booklets to fully understand the meaning of each Declarative Statement. Interpretation of the Declarative Statements for Cybersecurity Maturity Levels above Baseline may require assistance from a third party or additional research.

We have found that a number of institutions with Inherent Risk Profiles of Least or Minimal have selected Yes for many Declarative Statements that the institution has not yet attained. If management is unsure of the meaning of a Declarative Statement, appropriate expertise should be sought before selecting Yes. Incorrectly indicating that the institution has attained a Declarative Statement will eventually lead to audit and examination findings.
Small community financial institutions should thoroughly evaluate a number of the Baseline level Declarative Statements before indicating that they have been attained. To view a list of these Declarative Statements, click here.

Conclusion
Completion of the FFIEC’s Cybersecurity Assessment Tool is a new process for financial institutions that will require feedback from the institutions that use the tool, as well as additional clarification from regulatory agencies. Institutions that spend time with examiners and risk management providers to understand and complete the tool accurately should gain a better understanding of their current cybersecurity risk level and be able to identify additional mitigating controls that can be implemented to prevent or reduce the impact of a cyberattack.

For more information on this article and/or how Young & Associates can assist your bank, contact Mike Detrow at 1.800.525.9775 or click here to send an email.

Capital Market Commentary – February 2016

By: Steve Clinton, President, Capital Market Securities, Inc.

We are now approaching seven years since the Great Recession. While the economic recovery has been slow, it has lasted much longer than a typical recovery. The average recovery, since the end of World War II, had been 58 months. The longest recovery on record was the 10-year period that spanned the 1990s. The length of the current recovery has been aided by the Fed’s maintenance of historically low interest rates. The Fed ended its “zero” rate posture and raised a key interest rate in December. This was the first increase in interest rates in almost a decade. How quickly the Fed is able to move interest rates higher will depend upon the continued strength of the economy.

Job creation continues to occur and unemployment has trended downward. Inflation remains in check. Business profitability may have reached a near-term plateau. Fourth-quarter earnings for the S&P 500 are expected to slide 5.3 percent, according to data provider FactSet. That would represent the third straight quarterly drop in profits, and the first time the S&P 500 has experienced such a decline since the first three quarters of 2009. Steady consumer spending has enabled the U.S. economy to continue to grow despite broad economic weakness globally.

As we enter 2016, there are a number of items worth monitoring:

  • Presidential Election – The Obama era enters its final year. The presidential campaigns have already begun in earnest. The primaries began February 1st. The future direction of the country will be decided in the next election.
  • Economic Growth – Last year, we predicted that “U.S. economic growth in 2015 will be hard-pressed to continue its strong pace.” Our prediction was correct in that the economy likely expanded 2 percent last year. The results reflect weak global trade and severe cutbacks by energy companies due to the slide in oil markets. Also, business investment has been limited. Our prediction for 2016 – a 2 percent growth comparable to 2015.
  • Housing – Home price values steadily accelerated throughout 2015, underscoring that the housing market is returning to normal as the economy improves. The S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index rose 5.2 percent in the 12 months ending in October. The index is up 36 percent from its low recorded in March 2012, and is only 11.5 percent below the high recorded in July 2006. We anticipate that real estate values will continue to increase at a moderate pace in 2016.
  • Oil Prices – In early 2015, we noted that oil prices had declined to $50 a barrel. Oil prices continued to decline in 2015 as supply outstripped demand. In early 2016, oil prices fell below $30 a barrel reaching a 12-year low. The prospect of up to 500,000 barrels a day of Iranian crude flooding an already oversupplied market is the main reason for oil price declines. We expect oil prices to fall to a level of around $25 a barrel and that will force major suppliers to restrict oil production which will drive oil prices higher in the second half of 2016.
  • Industrial Production – The industrial sector remains soft. Capacity utilization fell to 76.5 percent in December. Before the recession, capacity use typically hovered above 80 percent. U.S. car sales were a bright spot in 2015. Auto sales were a record, passing a total last reached 15 years ago as cheap gasoline, employment gains, and low interest rates spurred Americans to snap up new vehicles. In all, auto makers sold 17.5 million cars and light trucks in the U.S. last year, a 5.7 percent increase. We anticipate slowing auto sales in 2016. Rising rates will make auto financing more expensive.
  • Imports/Exports – Europe and Japan, the U.S.’s major trading partners are at risk economically. China’s problems have been well discussed in the press. However, U.S. exports account for only about 13 percent of gross domestic product. If the rest of the world falters, a relatively small share of U.S. production will be exporting into the weakness. We do expect the strong dollar and continued economic struggles of our trading partners to cause exports to trail 2015 levels.
  • Consumers – Consumer confidence is being tested as we enter 2016. For the six-year period beginning January 2009 until the end of 2014, the S&P 500 more than doubled. This increased wealth added to consumer confidence and consumer spending. In 2015, the S&P 500 was essentially flat for the year. 2016 has begun with a market correction of nearly 10 percent. It is likely the recent stock market results will weigh on household finances. Offsetting the negative of lowered net worth will be lower gas prices that will serve to increase consumers’ incomes. Overall, we anticipate consumer spending to hold steady.
  • Fed – We mentioned last year that we expected modest rising rates in the second half of 2015. We also predicted that the Fed would be patient. We only got one rate increase in 2015. With the state of the economy, we would expect the Fed to continue to move slowly in 2016 in its effort to move interest rates upward.

Market Update
The overall stock market ended lower in 2015. The U.S. stock market encountered its first correction (a drop of at least 10 percent) in four years in August. The Dow declined 2.23 percent in 2015 while the S&P 500 Index was down 0.73 percent. Short-term interest rates ended 2015 with the 3-month T-Bill at 0.16 percent. Longer-term interest rates increased modestly in 2015. The 10-year T-Note ended the year at 2.27 percent, compared to 2.17 percent at December 31, 2014.

Bank pricing followed the overall market decline in 2015. The KBW Bank Index declined 1.59 percent for the year. Bank prices, as measured by the KBW Bank Index, remain nearly 40 percent below the highs recorded in 2006.

Merger and Acquisition Activity
Merger activity in 2015 was comparable to the level of activity in 2014. Pricing on 2015 bank sales was comparable to 2014’s pricing, recording a median price to book multiple of 141 percent and a price to earnings multiple of 22.4 times.

Interesting Tidbits
As has been our custom from time to time, we like to pass along various items that we have seen that you might enjoy reading:

  • The number of Americans seeking first-time jobless benefits is lower this year than any since 1973. (Note: The labor force has nearly doubled since 1973.) This indicates that the number of workers involuntarily losing their jobs is trending near historical lows.
  • The U.S. bull market is now more than 6½ years old, the fourth longest on record.
  • JPMorgan Chase expects to spend about $500 million on cybersecurity in 2016. Bank of America Chairman Brian Moynihan has said that the bank’s cybersecurity budget is unlimited. John Stumpf, Chairman of Wells Fargo, said the bank spends “an ocean of money” on cybersecurity. Says Stumpf, “it’s the only expense where I ask if it’s enough.”
  • U.S. merchants are said to have paid $61 billion in interchange fees last year.
  • High-yield bond assets held by U.S. mutual funds total over $300 billion, triple their level in 2009.

Young & Associates, Inc. has a successful track record of working with our bank clients in the development and implementation of capital strategies. Through our affiliate, Capital Market Securities, Inc., we have assisted clients in a variety of capital market transactions. For more information on our capital market services, please contact Stephen Clinton at 1.800.376.8662 or click here to send an email.

A Capital Plan That Addresses Enterprise Risk Management

By: Gary J. Young, President and CEO

The need for community banks to complete a Capital Plan has intensified since the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued guidance which closely corresponds with the manner in which the FDIC and Federal Reserve assess capital adequacy according to information in their examiner’s handbook. The concept is that the bank (1) assess capital adequacy in relation to its unique overall risks, and (2) plan for maintaining appropriate capital levels in all economic environments. A bank should maintain a sufficient level of capital based on the associated risk at the bank and within the economic environment comprised within the bank’s market. This sounds a lot like Enterprise Risk Management. In fact, I believe that Enterprise Risk Management is morphing into Capital Planning based on risk.

This article outlines the methodology that Young & Associates. Inc. recommends in meeting this guidance.

Step 1 – Developing a Base Case
A five-year projection of asset generation and capital formation (earnings less dividends) would be used to project the future tier-1 leverage ratio and risk-based capital ratios. This is the base case scenario. Within this scenario, minimum capital adequacy standards will be established. At this point, there will be no additional capital for risk. As an example, for the tier-1 leverage ratio, the bank might establish a 5.0 percent minimum plus a 1.5 percent additional for unknown risk. This approach would be similar to the Basil III calculation. This would establish a 6.5 percent leverage ratio minimum. This example is for the leverage ratio only. A separate calculation would be needed to examine risk-based capital.

Step 2 – Identification and Evaluation of Risk
The focus here will be in identifying and evaluating all risk within the Enterprise:

  • Credit risk
  • Operational risk
  • Interest rate risk
  • Liquidity risk
  • Strategic risk
  • Reputation risk
  • Price risk
  • Compliance risk

The risk would be assigned a level (i.e., extreme, high, moderate, and low) and a trend (i.e., decreasing, stable, or increasing). Based on these assignments, additional capital may be added to the base. In the analysis of risk you should examine the current position, as well as potential risk in a stressed environment. You should also look closely at regulatory examinations, audit reports, and observation of current systems. Consider assigning additional capital for each position within the risk levels. It is acceptable and advisable that differing risk areas would have differing impacts on capital need. As an example, credit risk might have a greater capital contribution than price risk. Let’s assume that an additional 1.25 percent in capital is required based on the bank’s risk profile. This is similar to the use of Qualitative Factors in the Allowance for Loans and Lease Losses. Added to the 6.5 percent from above, the new capital adequacy level based on risk would be 7.75 percent.

It is possible that your directors would want the leverage ratio to exceed 7.75 percent. Let’s assume that percentage is 9.0 percent. While directors want 9.0 percent, those directors could also state that based on our risk compared with others, 7.75 percent is the measure for regulatory capital adequacy. This is not inconsistent.

Step 3 – Capital after Lending Stress
Both the FDIC and the OCC have suggested models for banks to stress capital based on stress from loan losses by loan classification. Young & Associates, Inc. strongly recommends that the appropriate model should be included in your bank’s planning process. The goal is for the model to indicate that the bank could survive a significant stress. This will also help in formulating your capital contingency which is discussed as Step 4.

 Step 4 – Contingency Planning for Stressed Events
If development of the base case and identification of risk is perfect with no internal or external errors, there would be no need for a contingency plan. However, as we all know, plans don’t work perfectly. Therefore, it is critical to stress all assumptions in the development of the base case and in the identification and evaluation of risk. The stress or worst-case scenario in these areas will determine the amount of capital needed to be raised. The analysis would then examine all realistic possibilities for increasing capital including, but not limited to:

  • Reducing assets from the base case
  • Asset diversification (impacts risk-based capital)
  • All profitability enhancement measures
  • Dividend reduction, if applicable
  • Branch sale, if applicable
  • Downstream cash from holding company
  • Capital raise from existing shareholders
  • Capital raise from new shareholders
  • Additional holding company debt
  • Sale of the bank

A brief word for mutual companies that are now regulated by the OCC: Many of the capital raising opportunities do not exist for a mutual. We would suggest that this is an additional risk for these banks. We would suggest that an additional 0.5 percent, or so, of additional capital is necessary for mutual banks compared with stock banks.

Step 5 – Policy
All of the preceding will be placed in policy and would include:

  • Assignment of roles and responsibilities
  • Process for monitoring risk tolerance levels, capital adequacy, and status of capital planning
  • Key planning assumptions and methodologies, as well as limitations and uncertainties
  • Risk exposures and concentrations that could impair or influence capital
  • Measures that will be taken based on differing stress events
  • Actions that will be taken based on stress testing

Young & Associates, Inc. has been working with banks to develop capital adequacy standards, a capital contingency, and the related policies. In addition, we have developed a product that will help you complete this risk assessment on your own in as little as one day. You can find this product by clicking here, or you can call our office. If you have any questions about this article or would like to discuss having Young & Associates assist your bank, please call Gary J. Young, President and CEO, at 330.283.4121, or click here to send an email.

Regulatory Attention on CRE Portfolios is Rising

By: Tommy Troyer, Senior Consultant and Loan Review Manager

Over the last several months, it has become increasingly difficult to miss the fact that the federal regulatory agencies (the FDIC, Federal Reserve, and OCC) believe that credit risk is on the rise across the banking industry and particularly within Commercial Real Estate (CRE) portfolios. While industry-wide developments are of course not necessarily reflective of the situation of any single bank, it is the case that regulatory concerns about building credit risk in CRE portfolios makes it more likely that your bank’s CRE policies, underwriting, and portfolio management will be closely scrutinized in your next safety and soundness exam. Note that in this context, CRE refers to what are sometimes called non-owner occupied commercial real estate loans: loans for which the sale of the property, take-out financing, or third-party rental/lease income are the primary sources of repayment.

Recent Comments on Increasing CRE Risk
On December 18, 2015, all three federal bank regulatory agencies issued the interagency Statement on Prudent Risk Management for Commercial Real Estate Lending, an existing guidance on CRE lending. In fact, the statement itself contains no new guidance or regulatory expectations. Its purposes, instead, appear to be to “remind financial institutions of existing regulatory guidance on prudent risk management practices” for CRE and, perhaps more importantly, to highlight the belief that credit risk in CRE portfolios is increasing and must be carefully monitored and managed. The guidance highlights several reasons to believe that CRE portfolios may experience some strain over the next several years. These include both market factors (historically low capitalization rates are cited) and findings from recent exams (easing of underwriting standards along several dimensions, increasing frequencies of underwriting policy exceptions, and insufficient monitoring of market conditions).

The new interagency statement is far from the only suggestion of increased concern regarding the CRE market. The OCC’s Semiannual Risk Perspective for Fall 2015 cites easing underwriting standards, increasing CRE concentrations (especially in multifamily), and for community banks, strong growth in CRE lending as possible risks. The December 2015 – January 2016 RMA Journal includes the final installment of the publication’s annual rundown of “Today’s Top Credit Risk Issues.” Multifamily lending makes the list, suggesting that the Risk Management Association, a respected industry group unaffiliated with any financial regulators, also sees notable risk in the CRE market.

The fact that the CRE market remains competitive in many areas, combined with low interest rates, has thus far meant that several traditional but lagging indicators of credit risk (for example, delinquency and non-accrual rates) have not yet shown signs of weakening. Nonetheless, as has been demonstrated in past credit cycles, the risk factors cited above can often lead to increases in credit risk that do eventually result in deteriorating asset quality and increasing charge-offs.

Prudent CRE Risk Management for Community Banks
The good news is that the keys to effectively managing risks in the CRE portfolio are not mysteries and are achievable for any disciplined and committed community bank. The recent interagency statement provides a good summary. It notes that, in part, banks that successfully manage CRE risk:

  • Establish and adhere to appropriate policies, underwriting standards, and concentration limits
  • Conduct accurate cash flow analysis on the project, borrower, and global levels at underwriting and on an ongoing basis
  • Effectively monitor market developments (supply and demand, vacancy and rental rates, etc.)
  • Implement appropriate appraisal review and collateral valuation processes

In addition to the factors described above, two additional critical features of CRE risk management, CRE Stress Testing and Independent Loan Review, are mentioned. These processes can be performed internally by community banks, but due to resource and other constraints may be both more efficient and more effective if outsourced.

Stress Testing the CRE Portfolio
The interagency statement notes that “market and scenario analyses” that “quantify the potential impact of changing economic conditions on asset quality, earnings, and capital” are an important aspect of CRE risk management. This is a reference to stress testing the CRE portfolio. Further, the 2006 interagency Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk Management Practices states that any institution with a CRE concentration “should perform portfolio-level stress tests.” Even if your bank does not meet the concentration thresholds defined in the 2006 guidance for identifying institutions with “potentially…significant CRE concentration risk,” stress testing the CRE portfolio can have a number of important benefits. By quantifying the impact of several adverse scenarios on asset quality, earnings, and capital, a CRE stress test can inform your bank’s strategic and capital planning processes, your internally established credit concentration limits and practices, and your credit policy and underwriting requirements.

Young & Associates, Inc. offers a CRE Portfolio Stress Testing service that provides an insightful and efficient stress testing solution. Our service uses data specific to your bank’s portfolio to stress your CRE portfolio across several factors. Our report will assist in quantifying the possible impact to earnings and capital that could result from decreases in collateral value, property net operating incomes, or increases in interest rates. In the current environment in which interest rate increases are likely over the next several years and decreases in collateral values are at least a distinct possibility, understanding your bank’s possible exposure is key to maintaining a safe and sound bank and demonstrating effective risk management to your examiners. Our CRE Stress Testing service is performed remotely, meaning that no travel expenses are associated with the service. More importantly, once the project has been discussed and you have provided a response to our initial data request, bank management can remain free to work on the many other initiatives that require attention, while we make use of our existing systems and expertise, making the stress testing process an efficient one. Our service includes a detailed report documenting the results of the stress test and, if desired, a phone presentation of the findings to management or the board.

Independent Loan Review
An effective independent loan review function is critical to assessing asset quality in the CRE portfolio, determining the accuracy and effectiveness of both underwriting and the ongoing monitoring of CRE credits, and identifying whether exceptions to credit policies or underwriting standards are being appropriately identified and approved by the bank. Any issues identified by loan review can be proactively addressed by the bank, helping to ensure risk mitigation is in place before the issues are identified by examiners or are revealed by deteriorating asset quality.

Most community banks find that their size and the requirement that loan review be performed by a qualified, independent party means that outsourcing loan review is the best option. Young & Associates, Inc. has extensive experience providing loan reviews for community banks. Our loan review of a sample of your CRE portfolio may identify individual credits of concern, but more importantly, will provide perspective regarding whether your credit standards, credit analysis, and ongoing monitoring of existing credits are adequate for the nature of your CRE portfolio. In this way, our findings not only inform management and the board about existing risks in the portfolio, but provide recommendations for effectively managing that risk. We can perform loan reviews on-site or, if your technological capabilities allow, remotely, allowing you to reduce or eliminate the travel expenses associated with the loan review.

For information regarding Young & Associates, Inc.’s CRE Stress Testing service, please contact Kyle Curtis at 1.800.525.9775 or click here to send an email. For information regarding Young & Associates, Inc.’s Independent Loan Review service, please contact Tommy Troyer at 1.800.525.9775 or click here to send an email.

Do You Know Where Your Data Went Last Night?

By: Mike Detrow, CISSP, Senior Consultant and Manager of IT

Maybe your data went to a football game on an employee’s smart phone. Or, perhaps your data met some international friends at an offsite backup location used by one of your service providers. In either case, if you do not know how your data moves and where your data is stored, you cannot protect it.

During our IT Audit engagements, it is not uncommon to see bank employees storing or transferring non-public information (NPI) using services such as Google Drive or Dropbox. This creates a very dangerous situation if one of these services suffers a data breach or the data is synchronized to personal devices infected with malware. In most of these cases, senior management does not understand how employees are handling NPI.

The importance of understanding and controlling NPI data flow and data storage is emphasized in the newly released version of the FFIEC’s Information Technology Management Handbook, as well as in the declarative statements to meet the Baseline maturity level within the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool. This article will discuss a process that can be used to document the data flow and data storage locations used within your institution and those used by your third-party service providers.

Here’s a way this could be used to illustrate the way that an institution can document data flow and data storage. You will first identify each Service or Application that uses NPI. Some examples of these services and applications include: core processing, lending platform, internet banking, and online loan applications. Next, you will identify the Vendor(s) associated with each service or application. The Process Type is used to identify the various processes that are performed using the specific service or application that may use different methods for accessing the data or result in data being transmitted through different connectivity types. An example of different process types can be illustrated with internet banking where data may flow between the core processing system and the internet banking system through a dedicated circuit, but customers access the internet banking system through a home internet connection. The Type of Data will most often be customer NPI, but may also include proprietary institution data. Data can be accessed in numerous ways including: institution workstations, institution servers, employee mobile devices, customer PCs, and customer mobile devices. The Connectivity Type may include: dedicated circuits, virtual private networks (VPN), local area networks (LAN), wide area networks (WAN), wireless networks, or the internet. Controls in Transit may include: encryption, firewall rules, patch management, and intrusion prevention systems (IPS). The Primary Storage Location(s) should include known locations where the data is stored such as: application or database servers, data backup devices, service provider datacenters, and service provider backup locations. The Optional Storage Location(s) should consider other places where data can be stored such as: removable media, an employee’s workstation, mobile devices, Dropbox, and Google Drive. Identifying the Optional Storage Location(s) may take a significant amount of time, as this step will involve discussions with application administrators to understand the options for exporting data and discussions with employees to understand their processes for transferring and storing data. A review of this information may lead to the implementation of additional controls to block the use of unapproved sharing and storage services.

Controls at Rest may include: encryption, physical security, and environmental controls. The Access Rights column should identify who can access the data at any point in time, which may include institution employees, service provider employees, and subcontractors used by a service provider.

This may seem like a daunting task to complete, and it may take a significant amount of time depending on the size and complexity of your institution. One option for implementing this process is to start with your annual vendor review process rather than trying to complete the process for all of your services and applications at one time. When you are gathering and reviewing documentation from each service provider, complete the table shown above for the service or application provided by that service provider. Documentation for internally managed systems and applications can also be completed over a period of time.

Upon completion of this process, you should have a full understanding of how your data moves between devices and where the data is stored. This information will allow you to justify the risk ratings within your information security risk assessment and identify additional controls that need to be implemented to properly protect your data.

For more information on this article, contact Mike Detrow at 1.800.525.9775 or click here to send an email.

Network Vulnerability Testing and the Case for Increasing Test Frequency

By: Mike Detrow, CISSP, Senior Consultant and Manager of IT

Even though you may only hear about a few IT vulnerabilities through mainstream news outlets each year, new vulnerabilities are being identified and reported on a daily basis. If remediation steps are not taken, a financial institution may be vulnerable to a cyber-attack if its information systems are affected by one of these vulnerabilities. A number of methods can be used to identify vulnerabilities that affect an institution’s information systems, including: network vulnerability testing, subscribing to services that provide vulnerability alerts, and monitoring vendor websites for vulnerability notifications. This article will focus on identifying vulnerabilities that currently exist within an institution’s information systems through the use of network vulnerability testing.

Network vulnerability testing is used to identify vulnerabilities such as misconfigurations, default passwords, and missing patches on network devices such as PCs, servers, routers, printers, and firewalls. This testing is typically performed using an automated tool that scans these devices for known vulnerabilities. The automated tool can perform either an un-credentialed scan or a credentialed scan. An un-credentialed scan assesses the vulnerabilities that can be detected without network credentials. A credentialed scan assesses the vulnerabilities that can be detected by a user that can log onto the network. An assessor reviews the results from the automated tool and performs tests to determine the applicability and criticality of the vulnerabilities detected before providing a report of the vulnerabilities and recommended remediation steps to the client.

We typically talk about external network vulnerability testing and internal network vulnerability testing. External network vulnerability testing focuses on the firewalls that the institution has implemented to protect its internal network. Internal network vulnerability testing focuses on the devices connected to the internal network which encompasses the institution’s operations center and any branch office networks.

In the past, it was typically deemed acceptable for smaller financial institutions to have network vulnerability tests performed on an annual basis. While this may have been acceptable for institutions with very static configurations, many institutions are actually making numerous changes to their IT environment over a one-year period that may introduce new vulnerabilities. Changes such as new software, new devices connected to the network, and firewall rule changes can create vulnerabilities that may not be identified until the next annual vulnerability test. Another common issue occurs when an institution takes steps to remediate an identified vulnerability, but the steps taken do not eliminate the vulnerability and it remains exploitable until the next annual network vulnerability test. It is also common for some institutions to focus only on external network vulnerability testing. However, it is important to test the internal network as well to identify any vulnerabilities that may be exploited by insiders or malware that makes its way onto an internal device.

With the increasing number of large-scale data breaches and the focus on cybersecurity, financial institutions should anticipate increased scrutiny from examiners during their evaluation of each institution’s selected network vulnerability testing schedule. While the network vulnerability testing frequency required for each financial institution will differ based on its size and complexity, most institutions should be increasing the frequency of external network vulnerability tests beyond once each year to help identify any potential vulnerabilities before they are exploited. Institutions should also consider increasing the frequency of internal network vulnerability testing to identify any vulnerabilities that may be exploited by insiders or malware.

For more information about this article or to learn more about the services offered by Young & Associates, Inc. to assist your financial institution with network security, please contact Mike Detrow at 1.800.525.9775 or click here to send an email.

 

How to Staff Branches in the Digital Age

By: Mike Lehr, Human Resources Consultant

The digital age has hit branches hard. Lines out the door no longer exist. Patterns of activity flatten with each passing day. Activity spikes can occur anytime. How should banks staff their branches in the digital age?

In the past, banks relied on transaction-based staffing models to answer these questions. In the digital age, these models show staff reductions year after year. Transactions are going down. From our studies and experience, community banks staff to peak demand for the week. That means for rest of the week excess capacity exists. Staff is idle. Now, the busiest time of day is when employees open and close branches. It is not when customers transact.

Still, customers need help. It is a different kind of help. It is not about transactions. It is about sales. The digital age has blown the doors off product and service offerings. It is no longer just accounts and loans. It is no longer about what kind of accounts and loans. It is about the many ways to access them. The ways to do business with banks have spread like weeds.

Customers still need help from a person. It is not help with transactions though. It is help with understanding what banks can do for them. It is advising. It is consulting. It is selling. Traditional transaction models do not deal with selling. They are about transactions. Reducing staff can reduce selling. The question becomes, “What are your people really doing?”

The digital age is turning branches into sales offices. Staffing models need to account for sales. It is about new accounts. It is about referrals. It is about cross selling. How much time does it take to do these things? How much time does it take to do them well?

Selling is more complicated than transacting. It is a team effort. Tellers could act as assistants for sales personnel. They could research customer data. They could identify customers who might need additional help. They could make up the call lists for customer service representatives, loan officers, and branch managers. Still, it boils down to what your people are doing. How much time is it taking? How much downtime is there? How much time are they selling? The answers will most likely surprise.

If you would like to learn more how Young & Associates, Inc. can help you answer these questions for your bank and your people, contact Mike Lehr at 1.800.525.9775 or click here to send an email.

5 Ways to Create Compliance Depth

By: Adam Witmer, CRCM, Compliance Consultant

As football season is now in full swing, many die-hard fans find themselves viewing the player roster of their favorite teams. They do this because they are curious, not about the obvious starters, but about those who are there to back up the starters. Football fans are often interested in the depth of skill their team has retained.

Just like an NFL team has a depth chart of skilled back-up players, it is important to have compliance “depth” within our financial institutions. This is especially true today as examiners have been shifting their expectations of compliance from a one-person dictatorship approach to a fully functioning “compliance management system” (CMS).

With so many new rule changes coming out by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, financial institutions can no longer depend on a single individual to be the sole person knowledgeable of compliance regulations. Having a depth of compliance knowledge ̶ both in quantity (number of employees) and quality (individual knowledge) ̶ is more important today than ever before. Therefore, financial institution leaders should consider building greater depth of compliance within their teams.

The following are five ways that every financial institution can build depth into the compliance function of their organizations.

A Formal Compliance Management System (CMS) Model
One of the best ways to infuse compliance depth into a financial institution is to develop a formal compliance management system (CMS) model which ultimately steers the institution’s compliance activities. While most financial institutions have some sort of compliance management system in place – a risk assessment, training, audit and/or monitoring, designating a compliance officer, and managing complaints – we have found that many of these programs are often informal in nature and don’t always establish depth in the overall program.

A formal CMS model is an intentionally designed program that goes above and beyond the core elements of a compliance management system – the model acts as the infrastructure for a compliance program. Generally, a CMS model will produce certain results:

  • Continuity of compliance, regardless of change
  • Pro-active compliance management
  • Clear communication of the CMS to examiners, directors, and additional parties
  • Integration of compliance into applicable job functions of the organization
  • Early detection of compliance issues
  • Strong regulatory change management

The idea is that a formal CMS model helps to ensure that systems, controls, and procedures are effectively implemented and maintained, which helps to naturally build depth into the compliance structure of an organization.

Integration
Another way any financial institution can create compliance depth is to proactively integrate compliance into applicable job functions of the organization. Years ago, compliance could often be approached as an add-on or after-thought to the main task at hand. For example, prior to the late 1960’s and 1970’s, creditors didn’t really have to worry about lending fairly among minorities, protected classes, or even different income levels. Over the years, however, fair lending has evolved so much that organizations that don’t have effective systems, procedures, and controls to ensure fair lending compliance can easily place themselves in a high-risk position for fair lending violations.

Integration can occur in a number of ways. First, policies and procedures can be enhanced to include compliance components. Secondly, controls and testing can include applicable compliance elements. Finally, compliance can become an essential part of employee expectations, such as the requirement of training and even consideration in performance evaluations.

When a financial institution integrates compliance into each applicable job function, a depth of compliance is naturally infused into the organization. This is exactly why many financial institutions are adopting a formal CMS model under which they operate.

Compliance Council
For well over a decade now, we at Young and Associates, Inc. have been advocating for the creation of a Compliance Council in many of our client financial institutions. A compliance council is a group of employees, often middle to senior management, who come together on a regular basis to provide oversite of the compliance function of the organization. While only a few financial institutions operate with just a compliance council (rather than having a designated compliance officer), many of those that do have a designated compliance officer also operate with a compliance council.

There are several reasons why a financial institution will operate with a compliance council in addition to having a designated compliance officer. First, the compliance council helps to provide support for the compliance officer. In today’s regulatory environment, it is often unreasonable for any financial institution to place all responsibility of regulatory compliance on the shoulders of one compliance officer. Therefore, a compliance council can help to distribute the compliance burden and help support the compliance officer.

In addition to providing support, a compliance council also helps to enhance communication in relation to compliance activities. While different departments within a financial institution often operate somewhat independently, a compliance council can help to bring various department managers together while focusing on a uniform goal of compliance.

A compliance council can be an integral component for building compliance depth and this is why many CMS models have a compliance council at the center of their model.

Succession Planning
Just as every NFL team has a depth chart that outlines who is ready to play a certain position, financial institutions can create compliance depth by establishing and maintaining a formal
succession plan for each applicable compliance function. While a compliance succession plan doesn’t need to be complex or even robust, having a clearly designated back-up person for each major compliance function helps to establish greater depth.

To establish depth, a succession plan should designate a back-up person for each significant area of compliance and outline who would assume responsibility in the event that the primary employee responsible for that area is unable to perform their duties. When a back-up person is formally designated and appropriately cross-trained, a CMS model will effectively continue without any major breaches in continuity, meaning that a greater depth of compliance is established.

Training
The final and probably most obvious way to create compliance depth is to conduct enhanced compliance training. Compliance depth can be added through training in two main ways: organizational training and individual training.
First, organizational training can be expanded to integrate compliance into the training rather than treating compliance as an afterthought. Therefore, compliance components should be included in new employee orientations, annual training initiatives, and even sales and other employee specific training sessions.

Secondly, training can increase compliance depth when employees, other than just the compliance team, receive in-depth training on compliance regulations that affect their job functions. For example, a loan processor manager may be able to greatly benefit from in-depth training on Regulation Z, while a lender may benefit on training specific to Regulation O.

Regardless of the type, training is a tool that helps to build compliance depth within an organization.

Summary
Creating compliance depth is going to become an even more important strategy for financial institutions as regulatory expectations continue to expand and evolve. In creating compliance depth, organizations will enhance their overall compliance posture by ensuring compliance continuity when employee positions change, providing better communication regarding the compliance function, infusing necessary components of compliance into each job function, and providing better communication to affected parties regarding the organizations compliance program.

Just as every sports team works to ensure that they have a depth of skilled players, financial institutions who establish compliance depth – through steps like establishing a formal CMS model – are going to fair much better in the long run than those who do not.

The Community Bank Capital Problem – Too Much

By: Gary J. Young, President & CEO

The Mantra
As community bankers, we have all heard the mantra to increase capital. This is heard by the banker who has an 8% leverage ratio and needs to increase capital to 9%, by the banker who has a 9% leverage ratio and needs to increase capital to 10%, and by the banker who has a 10% leverage ratio and needs to increase capital to 11%. Based on this view regarding capital, more is always better. I disagree.

Capital Adequacy
I agree with the OCC. Capital adequacy at each bank is uniquely based on the current and planned risk within the bank. And, it is the responsibility of the bank board to determine capital adequacy with the input from executive management. Capital adequacy is the point at which a capital contingency plan is implemented if actual capital falls below that point. In other words, let’s assume capital adequacy has been defined as a 7.5% leverage ratio, or a 11.25% total risk-based ratio. If actual capital falls below either measure, the bank should implement the methodology for improving capital as described in the capital contingency plan.

Capital Target
A bank’s target or goal for capital is higher than capital adequacy. It is an estimate of the amount the board of directors has decided is desired to take advantage of opportunities such as additional organic growth, branch expansion, purchase of a bank or branch, stock repurchase, etc.; or to use as additional insurance or protection against negative events that could hurt profitability and capital. As an example, a 7.5% leverage ratio could be defined as capital adequacy, but the target level of capital is 9.0%.

Cost
Excess capital has a cost. Let’s assume you had to eliminate $1 million of excess capital. To balance that transaction, you would also eliminate $1 million in assets which would be investments. Let’s assume that the investments had an average yield of 1.5%. After taxes, that would be approximately 1.0%. Based on this example, the return on equity of the $1 million of excess capital is 1.0%. We must agree that 1.0% is unacceptable. Well, it is unacceptable unless that is your return for opportunity capital or insurance capital as described above.

Another example of the cost of excess capital can be seen here. There are four banks with a 1% ROA. However, the equity/asset ratio at each is different, ranging from an 8.0% leverage ratio to a 12.0% leverage ratio. By dividing the ROA by the leverage ratio, you get the ROE. By multiplying the ROE by an assumed PE, you get the multiple of book. In this example, the bank with an 8.0% leverage ratio has a value of $30 million while the bank with a 12.0% leverage ratio has a value of $20 million. This is a simplified example that provides information on the cost of excess capital.

The Right Amount
There is no right amount. The average less than $1 billion bank has a 10.8% leverage ratio and a 16.6% total risk-based capital ratio. Most everyone would agree that banks do not need that level of capital. But, every bank is unique with different levels of risk and different levels of risk appetite. The important thing is that executive management and the board of directors understand that there is a shareholder cost to holding excess capital.
That doesn’t make it wrong. The board of directors has multiple responsibilities and at times they can be conflicting. From the shareholder perspective, you want to maximize the return on equity and shareholder value which assumes leveraging capital, but you must also oversee the operation of a safe and sound bank. And, at the heart of safety is capital adequacy. It takes balance and awareness of both to determine the right level of capital for the bank. My concern is that through the Great Recession and after, the capital mantra has been “more is better.” Well frankly, more is not necessarily better. I am suggesting that it is time to balance the capital need for risk management with the capital need for improving shareholder value.

Best Practices
The question for executive management is what should I do? It is my opinion that best practices would indicate that every bank develop a definition of capital adequacy based on inherent risk. Furthermore, a capital contingency plan should be part of that plan that indicates the steps the bank might take if capital falls below or is projected to fall below your definition of capital adequacy. You should then have a frank discussion at the board level on the amount of capital that is your goal or comfort level. If you then find that your capital is above that, consider the following:

  • Focus on additional organic growth, if possible.
  • Expansion opportunities. I would suggest looking for opportunities that begin turning a profit in two years or less.
  • A stock repurchase plan. This is a win for the shareholders that want to sell and the shareholders that want to hold. Everyone wins and shareholder value should increase.
  • A slow, steady increase in dividends to shareholders.

Consider how all of these items might impact your capital adequacy, return on equity, and shareholder value over a 3-5 year period. Remember, the goal of executive management is to maximize profitability and shareholder value within capital guidelines approved by your board of directors.

For More Information
If you would like to discuss this article with me, you can contact me 1.800.525.9775 or click here to send an email.

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Compliance — Recent Changes

By: Sharon Jeffries, Human Resources Manager

Did you know?

Recent changes to the health and welfare side of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) now mandates that all employers/plan administrators provide a Summary Plan Description (SPD) to each plan participant and that ERISA-covered plans be maintained in accordance with a written Wrap Plan Document.

The SPD is an important document that tells participants what the plan provides and how it operates. If a plan is changed, participants must be informed, either through a revised summary plan description, or in a separate document, called a summary of material modification, which also must be given to participants free of charge.

A Wrap Plan Document is designed to meet plan documentation requirements under ERISA and other federal laws and to incorporate all other welfare plans, insurance contracts and other relevant documents into a single plan. These materials can be kept together for administrative ease. The Wrap Plan Document provides additional legal protection for the employer and plan fiduciaries and can simplify plan administration.

What does that mean?

In the past, much of the regulatory focus was on the retirement side of the ERISA legislation. However, with the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that has changed.  Much of the current government monitoring, oversight, and auditing relates to the health and welfare side of the ERISA regulation.

ERISA now requires employers who are plan administrators of their group health plans to comply with two (2) critical requirements or they will risk potential penalties and possible government audits.

Those requirements are:

  • Maintain and distribute SPD’s to plan participants which accurately reflect the contents of the plan and which include specific information as required under federal law.
  •  Group health plans must be administered in accordance with a written Plan Document which must be made available to plan participants and beneficiaries upon request.

Are you at risk?

Yes, and the reason is this: Many banks will mistakenly assume that insurance contracts, certificates of insurance and benefit summaries fulfill the ERISA requirements for an SPD and Plan Document, but they do not.  And, the primary reason is they do not include the required or recommended provisions that protect the plan and the employer.

What should you do?

Recognize that:

  • Failure to provide an SPD or Plan Document within 30 days of receiving a request from a plan participant or beneficiary will result in a penalty of up to $110/day for each violation
  • Lack of an SPD could trigger a plan audit by the United States Department of Labor (DOL)
  •  The United States DOL has increased its audit staff and national enforcement initiatives to investigate employers’ compliance with Health Care Reform, resulting in companies of all sizes  being audited and being required to provide an SPD and Plan Document

The Solution

Do not try to create these in house. Allow experts in the areas of benefits and benefits regulations assist you with this monumental effort.  Young & Associates, Inc. has partnered with The Alpha Group Agency, Inc. to offer our clients this unique service.  The Alpha Group Agency, Inc. is a highly skilled, reputable organization involved in the management of health insurance services as well as other related subjects.

The Alpha Group Agency, Inc. has been an advisor to Young & Associates, Inc. for almost fifteen (15) years in the management of its group health insurance plans. For additional information on how you can become compliant with these critical ERISA regulations and also lower the risk of a DOL audit, contact Sean Nehlsen, The Alpha Group Agency at 800-886-3315 or snehlsen@thealphaga.com.

HELOC End-of-Draw Risk Remains Worthy of Attention

By: Tommy Troyer, Consultant and Loan Review Manager

In “Agencies Issue New HELOC Guidance,” published in the August 2014 issue of the 90 Day Note, we presented an overview of what was at that time brand new safety and soundness guidance for HELOC portfolios (Interagency Guidance on Home Equity Lines of Credit Nearing Their End-of-Draw Periods). We also presented a few practical steps for community banks to consider in order to address the issues raised in the guidance. As a brief reminder, the guidance was issued by the regulatory agen­cies to encourage financial institutions to properly manage the risk associated with HELOCs that were reaching the end of their contractual draw period. The draw pe­riod is the time during which the borrower has access to the line of credit feature of the HELOC. Minimum monthly payments during this time can be quite low, in many cases interest-only. When the draw period ends, HELOC structures either require a transition to payments that amortize the outstanding debt over a defined number of years or require a balloon payment to repay the outstanding balance in full. The risk associated with this transition is that the borrower will experience a “payment shock” because the terms after the draw period ends can require significantly higher minimum monthly payments than were required during the draw period. Higher monthly debt service, all else equal, increases the risk of delinquency and default.

It was the potential for payment shock risk associated with end-of-draw HELOCs, coupled with the fact that across the industry the peak of HELOCs reaching end-of-draw was expected to occur from 2014-2017, that prompted the interagency guid­ance. We are now about a year down the road from the issuance of the guidance, and the idea of elevated risk embedded in some HELOC portfolios continues to receive regulatory, media, and analyst attention. We wanted to briefly revisit the issue to point out two important facts for community banks with HELOC portfolios. First, the avail­able evidence is suggesting that regulators and bankers were right to worry about payment shock risk, as borrowers who have reached the end-of-draw period thus far have demonstrated, in the aggregate, the intuitively expected decline in timely pay­ments. Secondly, it is important to note that it is not too late to take important steps to help mitigate end-of-draw risk.

End-of-Draw Performance Thus Far
Aggregate data on HELOC and mortgage delinquencies does not demonstrate any notable increases that we can attribute to end-of-draw risk. However, one needs to dig deeper to measure the issue with any accuracy, primarily because end-of-draw HE­LOCs still represent a relatively small share of the overall mortgage market (and even the HELOC market), and any increases in delinquency due to end-of-draw payment shocks can easily be masked by the overall improvements in mortgage delinquency rates associated with continued economic improvement and continued progress in most states in working through foreclosure backlogs (which reduces the number of long-term, seriously delinquent loans and improves overall delinquency rates).

Several more specific pieces of data on end-of-draw risk are worth noting:

  • The OCC’s Semiannual Risk Perspective for Spring 2015, published June 30, 2015, shows that 30+-day delinquency rates for loans that have reached end-of-draw at the nine largest OCC-regulated banks have essentially doubled in the three-months following the end of the draw period, and have remained persis­tently high. The OCC also notes that, “many lenders have found the early stages more challenging than expected,” which should provide a wake-up call for any banks that still believe this issue will take care of itself without proactive man­agement on the part of the bank.
  • Data provided by Equifax, which was cited in a front-page Wall Street Journal article in June, indicated that just four months after reaching the end-of-draw pe­riod, HELOC borrowers from the 2004 vintage saw 30+-day delinquency rates increase by over 50% from the month prior to when they reached end-of-draw (2.7% to 4.3%). Similar increases are shown for vintages from 2000-2003 as well.
  • A study by Experian, reported on its website, showed that 90-day delinquency rates increased three-fold during the 12 months of 2014 for those borrowers that reached their end-of-draw period between December 2013 and March 2014.
  • Research published in the May 2015 RMA Journal by the other primary credit reporting agency, TransUnion, does not provide as directly comparable data as the previously mentioned studies, but does indicate that its data set of HELOCs showed overall 30+-day delinquencies of 2.2% while HELOCs 12 months after their payment shock showed a 60+-day delinquency rate of 3.1%.

The overall takeaway from all of this data is that the intuitive and expected impact of HELOC payment shock—increases in delinquency and eventually default and loss rates—does in fact appear to be occurring.

Impact on Community Banks and Risk Management Steps
The experience of any individual community bank will by no means mirror the overall industry experience. For one thing, the minimum payment required during the draw period does vary across banks, and banks that require significant principal reduction each month during the draw period may be less vulnerable to payment shock than those that required just interest-only payments. (Requiring principal reduction during the draw period certainly does not make a bank immune from payment shock, as it is important to keep in mind that the borrower also loses access to the line of credit as a source of funds when the draw period ends.) Further, community banks may have some advantages over larger lenders in terms of customer familiarity that may assist in working through end-of-draw issues with borrowers.

With that said, it is important to recognize that both the theory and the data are in line on this issue so far: all else equal, payment shock results in increased risk for the lender. In fact, the credit reporting agency research cited above also provides data indicating that the negative effects of payment shocks carry over to other credit facili­ties of borrowers, which presents an additional source of risk to relationship-minded community banks who may have multiple loans with a HELOC borrower. For these reasons, it is important that all community banks with HELOC exposures evaluate the interagency guidance’s recommendations and take the actions appropriate for their portfolio. We discussed these issues in more detail last year, but important steps include: 1) defining consistent and prudent options for borrowers approaching the end of their draw period that take into account the borrowers’ current financial and home value positions; 2) proactively initiating contact with borrowers who are ap­proaching the end of their draw periods; 3) ensuring that all relevant parties within the bank have a voice in the bank’s approach to mitigating risk and are well-versed in the steps to follow with end-of-draw borrowers; and 4) gathering and analyzing enough data specific to your bank to fully understand the nature of the risk your bank faces.

End-of-draw risk does not need to lead to a massive amount of charge-offs to ma­terially impact a community bank’s performance, especially given the low level of charge-offs many banks have been experiencing in that portfolio. Though there are very few, if any, banks for which end-of-draw concerns may represent an existential risk, a failure to properly manage end-of-draw risk could easily have a notable im­pact on earnings over the next several years, and could also result in weak regula­tory assessments of a bank’s risk management. The OCC has publicly noted that it is pursuing a review of HELOC practices, and while this targeted horizontal review is unlikely to directly affect community banks, it would be a good bet that HELOC end-of-draw practices will be a point of emphasis in many community banks’ next safety and soundness exam, regardless of the examining agency.

Conclusion
The evidence continues to suggest that proper risk management of end-of-draw HELOCs is important. One consideration not directly mentioned above is that some banks may also find it beneficial to use their end-of-draw experience to consider whether any changes to their existing HELOC product’s structure would be appro­priate. If you have questions or would like to discuss your end-of-draw risk manage­ment, please contact me at ttroyer@younginc.com or 1.800.525.9775.

Moving Closer to a Guaranteed Statement of Costs – Integrated Disclosures

By: Bill Elliott, CRCM, Senior Consultant and Manager of Compliance

The new Integrated Disclosures will be upon us in a few short months and will create some unique difficulties for financial institutions. In the distant past, creditors gave the applicants a Good Faith Estimate. However, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) decided that the information was too scattered, etc., and in 2009 announced a new more consolidated format. The goal that HUD had was laudable, but their form really did not improve the situation much, if at all.

Upon the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, a new federal agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was told to remedy this situation once again, and specifically to combine the Good Faith Estimate and early Truth in Lending Disclosure (into the Loan Estimate), as well as combine the HUD-1 and final Truth in Lending Disclosure (into the Closing Disclosure). The new forms are an improvement from the current forms, but are also quite complex. The teaching manual that Young & Associates is using for live training runs several hundred pages to explain how to complete the 8 pages of new forms.

Creditors currently have three categories of charges that exist on the Good Faith Estimate – those that have to be correct, those that (as a group) have to increase no more than 10%, and those that represent the creditor’s best guess (typically escrow, insurance, and odd days interest).

The new forms and instructions maintain the “best guess” category as it exists in the current format, so we will not discuss this category further. The issue is with the first two categories – settlement service charges that must be correct and those that must as a group be within 10%.

Settlement Service Charges

Under the current rule, some settlement service charges must be correct. These items include charges that are fully within the creditor’s control – typically their own charges or the mortgage broker’s charges. Beginning August 1, the new rule will still include the creditor’s own charges, but also expand this area as follows:

  • Amounts payable to the creditor’s affiliates and the mortgage broker’s affiliates
  • Settlement services for which the creditor will not allow the consumer to shop.  These would include:
    • Appraiser
    • Credit bureau
    • Tax service companies
    • PMI companies
    • Governmental fees for government programs
    • Flood determination fees
    • And perhaps others.

These fees will have to be correct. This is not likely to create much difficulty, as these charges are rarely an issue. For instance, if the creditor only uses two appraisers, every Good Faith Estimate generated now will list the fee for the appraiser that charges the highest amount.

The problem is that all of these items now are removed from the 10% calculation, meaning that the “cushion” that creditors have had for 10% tolerance items will decrease, as the calculation relies on items subject to the 10% tolerance, and those items are shrinking.

You will note that the second bullet point above included settlement services for which the consumer is not permitted to shop. This creates another level of risk for creditors. For instance, if the creditor does not allow the consumer to shop for a title company, then the title company fees also must be accurate, as this fee moves from the “10%” category to the “must be correct” category. This would apply to any other service for which the consumer is not permitted to shop. So the reality is that if you decide to not allow your consumer to shop for any settlement service, every fee will have to be correct, and the only settlement service charge that will appear in your “10%” category will be filing fees.

The only protection here is to allow the consumer to shop. The phrase “allowing the consumer to shop” does not mean giving them a list and making them pick settlement service providers off the list. If creditors do that, then the creditor has not allowed the consumer to shop. Allowing them to shop means giving them a list of settlement service providers (which you should already have at least partially developed), and telling the consumer that they can shop for these services. Often, the response from the consumer will be to say, “I don’t care, use whoever you want.” If this happens, then the creditor may use their “regular” provider, and the settlement service remains in the 10% category. There is a difference between forcing them to choose off a list and the consumer abdicating their shopping rights.

Of course, the best position for the creditor is when the consumer does shop and hires another competent provider for a settlement service. As soon as they decide to do so, the consumer agrees to assume the entire liability for paying that provider. The creditor discloses what the creditor’s provider would charge, and whatever the final fee is, the consumer must pay it with no risk to the creditor.

The regulation is quite clear that in order to explain to the consumer that they have a right to shop for a specific settlement service, the service and one provider must appear on the settlement service provider list. This list, and what needs to appear on it, will now be dictated by a new form, which will become part of the application disclosures.

Preparing for the New System

To prepare for this new system, creditors need to assure that they do the following:

  • Determine settlement service providers for each service that the creditor might EVER require, even if it only is required once a year.
  • Determine what the charge will be, or determine a method to calculate the charge so that the creditor can get it “right” on the Loan Estimate. Creditors will have to understand that for settlement services that are only required every few months, they may have to telephone the provider prior to completing the Loan Estimate if they have not used that provider recently.
  • Work with settlement service providers who add on multiple fees from closing to closing. This area is mostly limited to title companies who have all sorts of small and miscellaneous fees. The discussion should probably be about how to remove these fees, because sooner or later the creditor may well have to pay them, given the smaller “10%” window.

This new structure need not create a massive increase in risk, provided you prepare for it now. Think about the providers, how they calculate their charges, and how you will assure that your staff will know what these charges will be. Just like the current Good Faith Estimate, if the first Loan Estimate has fatal flaws, there will be no legal way to repair the damage.

Integrated Disclosure Review

Young & Associates, Inc. offers an Integrated Disclosure Review service for sample documents and sample loans as you prepare for this transition and set up your loan types. You will need to provide an appropriate narrative to us that explains the loan and its terms, then provide the Loan Estimate and the Closing Disclosure. The purpose of this review is to determine that the loan type is properly set up and ready to go before the mandatory August 1 deadline. Young & Associates, Inc. will not validate APRs and other similar items. For more information, click here.

Reg Z Policy

We will also be releasing our new Regulation Z mortgage loan policy on or about June 15, allowing time for customization of the policy and board approval prior to the mandatory August 1, 2015 date. For more information, contact Bryan Fetty at bfetty@younginc.com or 1.800.525.9775.

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